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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD-EVIDENCE, INFERENCE,
RULES, AND JUDGMENT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE
INTRIGUING CASE OF
WALTON V.ARIZONA
RONALD J. ALLEN*
0 senseless preoccupation of mortals,
How imperfect those syllogisms are
With .which
your wings down to the ground!
Some you
werebeat
in pursuit of aphorisms, some
The Law; and some werefollowing the priesthood.
This sought rule by force and that by sophistry.
Some were in the civil service, some went stealing;
Some tired themselves, entangled in the
Pleasuresof the flesh; some gave themselves to easeWhile I, no longer tied to all these things,
Was being gloriously received up in Heaven with Beatrice at my side.*
I.

Different intellectual tasks may call for different intellectual
tools, an obvious but often overlooked fact. The point is obvious
because we observe it constantly in life. The intellectual task of the
theoretical physicist is not that of the diagnosing physician, that of
the historian is not that of the chemist, and that of the judge is not
that of the legislator. The point is often overlooked because different disciplines tend to have a dominant methodology that is taken as
characterizing the discipline, with the resultant obfuscation of the
nature of nonstandard tasks within the discipline. In the law
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. As always, I am indebted to my colleagues for assistance, in this case Kenneth Abbott, Robert Burns, Jim Haddad, Linda
Hirshman, Gary Lawson, and Larry Marshall.
** DANTE, THE DMvNE COMEDY 356"(Pocket Books ed., L. Biancolli trans. 1968).

727

728

RONALDJ. ALLEN

[Vol. 81

schools, for example, there is still much talk of training students "to
think like a lawyer," as though there were a single way in which lawyers think, and there is an analogous discussion about the nature of
legal reasoning, as though there were such a methodology consistently applied across the various intellectual tasks generated by the
legal system. But if different tasks do call for different tools, it
would be remarkable if that fact were not reflected in any complex
discipline such as the law. While the dominant methodology,
whatever it is, may work quite well for the most part (and if it did
not, it would not likely dominate), nonstandard situations may arise
that call for nonstandard treatment.
What is probably true of the law generally is certainly true of
appellate decision making particularly. Most appellate decisions
employ a deductive, rule-based methodology. The nature of the
disputed issue is carefully specified, the relevant sources of authority
are identified, and the answer is ostensibly deduced from those
sources through conventional, logical, syllogistic reasoning. This
process is defensible in its own right in many instances, and defensible as a means of expressing a conclusion reached in other ways in
other instances. It is defensible in its own right when the problem
under consideration lends itself to such a methodology. It is defensible as a means of expressing a conclusion reached in some other
way when doing so yields important information to others in the
planning of their affairs.
These two justifications for the deductive methodology sweep
widely over the scope of authority of appellate courts. Much of the
grist of that mill is composed of questions having recognized
sources that yield their deductive answers. Much appellate decision
making clusters around the interpretation of language, and most
theories of interpretation, statutory and constitutional, are of this
sort. If the theory of interpretation is literalism, there must be
sources for the meaning of words and combinations of words that
can be applied deductively to the task at hand. If the theory of interpretation is intentional, some identifiable person's state of mind at
some identifiable time controls, and controls deductively.' And if
I I mean neither to endorse any of these views nor to assert that they are coherent.
If they are incoherent, they are so for reasons that I will develop in this article in the
context of a narrowly defined set of problems. The essence of those reasons is that the
deductive form hides a problem of inference or judgment. Although I do not wish to
make the larger argument, there is substantial evidence of its validity. Often when the
Court purports to be applying a constitutional phrase "literally," the Court comes
across as naive, if not downright silly. An example is Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
The question in Coy was whether the state's practice of placing a screen between complaining witnesses and the defendant in child sex abuse cases violated the confrontation
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the task is to specify clear rules in order to permit individuals to
conform their conduct to the rules, then a highly deductive process
with its specification of the sources of authority and their significance is a useful way to communicate the content of those rules re2
gardless how they were in fact constructed.
Some questions that appellate courts are asked to resolve are
not obviously amenable to a deductive, rule based approach either
because such an approach does not yield helpful answers or because
those answers cannot be extended to other cases. The primary factor determining if either of these possibilities is present is the dynamic nature of the process generating the question under
consideration. 3 If the process is static, the deductive approach
works quite well. In a static system, the scope of inquiry is limited to
the relatively fixed parameters of the system, thus permitting the
careful specification of those parameters, and how they interrelatearithmetic, for example. With fixed parameters, any particular answer to a given question is more likely projectable to other questions not presently being asked, as there is less risk of the intrusion
of foreign elements into the equation.
clause. The Court struck this down as violating "the irreducible literal meaning of the
clause: 'a right to meetface-to-face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.' " Id. at
1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added by Court). Whatever else justifies the outcome in Coy, "the irreducible
literal meaning" does not cut the mustard. The literal words of the clause are: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. There is no mention here of a right
to be confronted at trial. For all one can tell from the "irreducible literal meaning," a
pre-trial confrontation would be acceptable. Indeed, this "irreducible literal meaning"
is supported by the use of the word "with." The clause says "confronted with;" it does
not say "confronted by," as the majority's "irreducible literal meaning" would require.
The Court's meaning is quite curious for another reason. It requires face-to-face
confrontations. Does that mean that a person who has had his face blown off, a war
casualty for example, but who could still communicate through other means than
speech, could never be a witness in a criminal case? How could a person without a face
confront the accused "face-to-face"? Perhaps the Court might conclude in such a case
that the "irreducible literal meaning" is head-to-head confrontations, or communicative
ability to communicative ability confrontations, but rather obviously the "irreducible literal meaning" is becoming increasingly metaphorical. The better question might be
why an opinion might be written that purports to rely on "irreducible literal meaning"
but that in fact involves interpretation.
2 There are complexities here. The syllogism as the primary tool of the judge has
been attacked on various grounds by such luminaries as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe
Pound, and John Dewey. For a discussion, see Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 17 (1924). These critics may be right in general; my, thesis is that they are
right in spades when applied to the particular subject matter I discuss in this article.
3 Another important factor is the nature of the review process. Dialogues can occur
between trial and appellate courts, but not between courts, at least appellate courts, and
jurors.
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None of this holds if the process generating the appellate question is dynamic. A dynamic process is too complex to be efficiently
captured by simplifying generalizations and is constantly in a state
of flux-weather patterns, for example. Thus, its parameters at best
can be captured as of a precise moment and at worst only approximated. The relationship of a particular state of the process to the
preceding and subsequent states is not obvious, and often a matter
of pure conjecture. How, then, an answer to any particular question
can be projected to other questions emanating from a dynamic process is quite problematic. "If/then" reasoning is not helpful where
the "if" is rarely replicated.
Perhaps the normal work product of the Supreme Court is amenable to a deductive methodology, more like arithmetic than
weather forecasting. It consists in large measure of statutory or
constitutional interpretation in the context of problems that may
have comprehensible, even if controversial, solutions that can be extended by deduction to other situations. This may be so, for example, in many of the structural questions of government that the
Court faces, and equally so in many of its statutory interpretations.
But there is one area in which it is definitely not so, in which the
relevant questions are more like weather forecasting than arithmetic, and that is the category of cases in which the inferential process
of some other decision maker is integrally related to the question to
be decided. 4 A number of the Supreme Court's decisions in the
criminal area are of this sort, yet the opinions of the Court, as is true
of appellate courts generally, reflect only sporadic awareness of the
possible need to employ nonstandard approaches to this set of
cases. The tendency is to decide them as though they called for no
different tools than a standard case of constitutional or statutory
construction. 5 If this thesis is correct, Supreme Court cases involving the inferential process should be both awkward and unstable:
awkward because infelicitous tools have been used and unstable because succeeding cases demonstrate the awkwardness of previous
decisions.
4 This may be related to, and possibly the defining characteristic of, one version of
Dworkin's "weak discretion." See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14
(1967). For an interesting discussion of discretion and the rules of evidence, see Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937 (1990).
5 This tendency is perfectly understandable. The world of the appellate jurist is for
the most part an artificial one. In Friedrich A. Hayek's useful terminology, it consists of
a "made" rather than a "spontaneous" or "grown" order. Inference and judgment,
though, involve spontaneous orders, and thus resist easy generalization or simplistic
description.

(1973).
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In this Foreword, I attempt to support the proposition that
cases involving the inferential process are systematically decided in
an awkward fashion that leads to instability. I develop this point in
the context of the Court's opinions regulating the death sentencing
process. I then turn briefly to three lines of cases involving the inferential process that possess analogous attributes to illustrate further the decisional awkwardness and instability that emanate from
putting static tools to dynamic tasks. Finally, I consider some alternative approaches.
II.
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is an oft told
tale that need not long delay us. In essence, it is a tale of an apparently inconsistent set of decisions concerning the role of discretion
in sentencing murderers to death. 6 In the standard version of this
story, the Supreme Court called a halt to executions because unguided discretion was resulting in capricious applications of the
death sentence, 7 subsequently reinstituted capital sentencing based
on statutes guiding the exercise of discretion,8 and most recently
has, in the view of one of its members,Justice Scalia, come full circle
to only approving death sentences if the decision maker has virtually
unfettered discretion to grant mercy, thus constitutionalizing the
very problem of capriciousness that led to constitutional rulings in
opposition to capital punishment. The case prompting Justice
Scalia's rather scathing assessment is Walton v. Arizona.9 The Walton
decision, and Justice Scalia's concurrence, is a paradigm of the issue
I wish to discuss, and so I turn to it first.
Walton is a fairly standard death penalty case, to-wit, a horrible,
brutal murder. Walton and two co-defendants were prowling for a
victim to rob, the plan being to steal the victim's car in addition to
any valuables they might find, leave the victim tied up in the desert,
and flee Arizona in the stolen automobile. The defendants discovered their victim, Thomas Powell, a young Marine, in the parking lot
of a bar, and put their plan into action. They robbed him at gun
point, forced him into his car, and drove into the desert. Some distance outside the city, Walton forced Powell out of the car, marched
6 Another component, but one not related to the task at hand, concerns the permissibility of sentencing to death for any offense other than murder.
7 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
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him into the desert, and shot him in the head. 10 Upon returning to
his companions, Walton described what he had done, and commented that he had "never seen a man pee in his pants before.""
The shot did not kill Powell, however. It blinded him and knocked
him out. He apparently regained consciousness, wandered blindly
in the desert, and ultimately died of dehydration, pneumonia and
12
starvation a day or so before he was found.
Walton was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to death by the trial judge following a separate sentencing
hearing conducted without a jury. Roughly following the jurisprudence apparently mandated by the Supreme Court, Arizona law
states that the sentencing judge "shall impose a sentence of death if
the court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances ...
and that there are no mitigating.circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."' 3 In this case, two aggravating circumstances were found-the murder was committed in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner, and it was committed for pecuniary gain. The judge then considered all the mitigating circumstances advanced by the defendant, but concluded that there were
"no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."' 14 Following Arizona law, the judge sentenced Walton to
death.
After working its way through the lower courts, Walton's case
reached the Supreme Court where four issues were raised, three of
which can be disposed of briefly. First, Walton claimed that a jury
must find the necessary facts underlying the sentencing decision, a
claim the Court rejected out of hand. According to the Codrt, the
aggravating and mitigating factors merely limit sentencing options;
they are not constitutionally compelled elements. Accordingly, they
need not be found byjuries. 15 Second, Walton claimed that the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" aggravating circum10 I do not pause over the various allegations made by the defendants concerning
who did what. The case was decided on these facts.
11 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052.
12 Id.
13 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989).
14 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3053.
15 All "elements" limit sentencing options, and as Justice Blackmun points out, the
aggravating factors could not be eliminated without eliminating the death penalty. Id. at
3072 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court's treatment of aggravating factors adds another curious chapter to the increasingly curious saga of the Court's treatment of essential elements of crimes and the constitutional implications of the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. For a discussion, see Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmaking in
CriminalCases: A Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv.L. REv. 321

(1980).
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stance was unconstitutionally broad, a claim rejected by the majority
after canvassing the narrowing interpretations given to the phrase
by the Arizona Supreme Court.1 6 Third, Walton claimed that the
"shall impose" language was unconstitutional, a claim properly rejected as it merely informs a sentencer of the implications of the
process. The point of the death penalty jurisprudence is to fashion
a process that leads to a moment at which a decision is taken
whether mercy should be exercised, a decision to be reached by
comparative analysis of the aggravating and mitigating features of
the case. The "shall impose" language merely informs a sentencer
of its obligations if mercy is not in order.
The remaining claim brings us to the heart of the problem. Relying on the implications of Mills v. Maryland,17 Walton claimed that
the statute's requirement that the defendant establish mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence was unconstitutional.' 8 In Mills, the relevant statute required unanimity to accept,
but not reject, a mitigating circumstance. Because of the obvious
problem this poses,' 9 the state courts had interpreted the statute to
require unanimity in both directions, and, lacking unanimity, the imposition of a life sentence. The Mills Court reversed because of ambiguity in the jury instructions, but did so in such a way as to give,
however ambiguously, credence to Walton's claim. Nonetheless,
the Walton Court rejected the claim. Relying on the distinction first
advanced in dissent by Justice Scalia in McKoy v. North Carolinabetween the admissibility and processing of evidence, 20 a plurality of
the Court, but as we shall see without Justice Scalia's participation,
16 As the dissents point out, the narrowing interpretations were not very narrow, and
this part of the majority's opinion may herald further reductions in Supreme Court involvement in death cases.
17 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
18 After the briefs were filed in Mills, McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227
(1990), was decided, which might also have lent support to the defendant's argument.
In McKoy, the jury was required to: (1) make unanimous findings beyond reasonable
doubt of aggravating circumstances; (2) make unanimous findings beyond reasonable
doubt of mitigating circumstances; (3) determine if it found beyond reasonable doubt
that the mitigating circumstances "found by you" are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances "found by you;" and (4) if the answer to (3) is yes, determine
whether "you unanimously find beyond reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances 'found by you' are sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances 'found by you.'" Id. at 1230. The Court reversed because "each juror
must be allowed to consider all mitigating evidence in deciding" whether to sentence to
death. Id. at 1233.
19 Because of the lack of unanimity on any particular element, each member of the
jury might believe mercy is in order, although for a reason agreed upon by less than the
entire group, and thus a death penalty would nonetheless be imposed.
20 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1241 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the Constitution forbids excluding from consideration "any particular type of mitigating evidence," but does not forbid a state "from specifying how mitigating circumstances are to be
proved." 2 1 Mills and McKoy only preclude a requirement of unanimity; they do not preclude requiring an individual juror to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence of the existence of a
mitigating circumstance.
The central argument of the majority is untenable as it stands,
but not, as I shall discuss, for the reasons advanced by the dissenters. The majority's argument has two difficulties. The first is that
the distinction between admission and processing is not as distinct
as the argument requires. The point of admitting evidence is so that
it may be considered; processing of evidence is how it is considered.
Rather obviously, how something is considered determines in part
whether it is considered. As the conditions of processing become
more rigorous, the distinction between processing and admissibility
collapses. Accordingly, the plurality's argument must proceed further to explain why any particular constraint on processing is acceptable. The only argument given by the plurality is a remarkable
non sequitur. The plurality analogized to the affirmative defense
cases such as Martin v. Ohio.2 2 But if those cases supply the answer,
the answer given in Mills and McKoy must be wrong. The affirmative
defense cases permit states to require unanimous findings on affirmative defenses, which is precisely the analogy rejected in Mills and
McKoy. Mitigating factors are either like affirmative defenses or they
are not. The plurality cannot have it both ways.
The second problem with the plurality's opinion stems immediately from a misguided faith in the conventional preponderance of
the evidence rule. Presumably the overarching desideratum in capital cases is to have the sentencer engage with whatever mitigating
factors are present. A preponderance of the evidence rule is an extremely crude tool to accomplish that purpose. Suppose that a defendant advances three grounds for mitigation, each of which is
established to a 0.25 probability, and thus not to be considered
under Arizona's rule. The probability that at least one of these factors is true, assuming they are independent, is 1-0.753=0.58.23 As
21 Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990).
22 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
23 The probability that each single factor is not present is 1-0.25=0.75. Under the
assumption that the three factors are independent, the probability that none are present
is 0.75 x 0.75 X 0.75=0.42. Thus, the probability that at least one is present is
1-0.42=0.58. If the factors are not independent, the effect is lessened but still present.
For more on this general problem, see Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66
B.U.L. REv. 401 (1986).
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more mitigating factors are advanced, or as they are proved to a
higher probability, this point is exacerbated. For example, if three
independent mitigating factors are each proved to a probability of
0.4, the probability that at least one of them is true is 0.78, yet the
sentencer must decide as though there were no ground for mitigation. The plurality does not explain, and indeed it could not rationally defend, how a 0.78 probability that one of three mitigating
factors is present differs from a 0.78 probability that a particular
mitigating factor is present. If the point is to advance some notion
of rationality, as the precursors to Walton suggest, then an obviously
wrong conclusion has been reached. Whether for this reason or
some other, the plurality's peremptory treatment of the defendant's
claim makes no mention of rationality. But it makes no other persuasive argument, either, relying solely on references to unilluminating authority and on the non sequitur noted previously.
These are not the objections raised by the dissenters. Justices
Brennan 2 4 and Blackmun 2 5 emphasize the cases requiring death to
be imposed "fairly and with reasonable consistency or not at all,"
but rather obviously consistency will not be advanced by increasing
discretionary sentencing, except for the tautology that all such
sentences will be discretionary. 2 6 Justice Brennan's point, though,
is not the tautological one. It is instead an emphasis on similar
treatment of similar individuals, but that simply highlights the error
that he makes. Discretionary sentencing forces the decision away
from objective standards that permit judgments of similarity, and
thus judgments of consistency and reliability, to be made and directs
it toward the unique matrix of background and experience possessed by the individual decision maker. To determine consistency
and reliability requires the articulation of categories, whereas individuated decision making forgoes categories. This does not mean
that individuated decision making is inconsistent or unreliable; it
means that those concepts are not applicable just to the extent that
the concern is to judge the uniqueness of some person or event by
Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3068-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3071 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See also id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)):
In noncapital cases, of course, the States are given broad latitude to sacrifice precision for predictability by imposing determinate sentences and restricting the defendant's ability to present evidence in mitigation or excuse. . . . This Court,
however, repeatedly has recognized that the 'qualitative difference between death
and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence
is imposed.'
26 Cf. Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 1 (1980); Gillers, The Quality of
Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection Stage of CapitalSentencing, 18 U. CAL. DAVIS L.
REv. 1037 (1985).
24
25
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reference to the unique background of a decision maker. It is also
just this point of tension between individuated decision making and
categorical reasoning that makes Justice Stevens' dissent difficult to
appraise, and that serves as the starting point for an appraisal of
Justice Scalia's opinion. First, Justice Stevens' dissent.
Justice Stevens' argument in essence is that by restricting the
scope of capital punishment, the risk of arbitrariness is sufficiently
27
reduced to permit individuated decisions with the remaining class.
According to Stevens, the decision in Furman was:
a function of the size of the class of convicted persons who are eligible
for the death penalty. When Furman was decided, Georgia included
virtually all defendants convicted of forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnapping and first-degree murder in that class. As the opinions in
Furman observed, in that large class of cases race and other irrelevant
factors unquestionably played an unacceptable role in determining
which defendants would die and which would live. However, the size
of the class may be narrowed to reduce sufficiently the risk of arbitrariness, even if a jury is then given complete discretion to show mercy
when evaluating the individual characteristics
of the few individuals
28
who have been found death eligible.
Justice Stevens then defended this assertion by pointing to the implications of the Baldus study that was the focus of McClesky v.
Kemp, 29 the lesson being "that there exist certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and
juries consistently impose, the death penalty without regard to the
30
race of the victim or the race of the offender."
Note first the curious structure of this argument. It asserts that
there is a knowable hierarchy of heinousness of offenses, and the
most heinous (however "most heinous" is understood) deserve the
death penalty while the others do not. The primary thrust of the
argument, then, is for categorical rather than discretionary sentencing. If there is a knowable category of cases that deserve the death
sentence, it is precisely those cases in which death should be imposed, and doing so would eliminate all concerns of arbitrariness.
In general, Justice Stevens' argument, like the plurality's and the
other dissenters', is a non sequitur. It is a defense of categorical sentencing put to the defense of discretionary sentencing.
There is one respect in which Justice Stevens' opinion is correct. He can be understood as asserting that as the size of the death
eligible group is reduced, the risk of the absolute number of cases
27 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3086 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
30 Walton, 110 S.Ct. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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involving jury arbitrariness in imposing death is decreased, where
"arbitrariness" means an inappropriate sentence is imposed. 5 '
While this is true, it does not equate with either reduced arbitrariness in the system as a whole or with a reduced proportion of arbitrary decisions by juries. Such matters could only be assessed in
light of knowledge of the proper decisions that should be made
throughout the system. For example, reducing the size of the death
eligible class will almost surely reduce the number of arbitrary death
sentences imposed, but it will just as surely increase the number of
arbitrary life sentences imposed (again, whatever "arbitrary" might
mean). Similarly, the effect on proportions will be determined by
the proportions in the excluded and included classes, and by how
the jury decides the cases. These are matters that require knowledge; a priori reasoning such as Justice Stevens' focusing simply on
the size of the relative classes is unenlightening. Accordingly, the
persuasive aspect of Justice Stevens' opinion reduces to defending
the present practices for the reason that the absolute number of arbitrary death sentences will be reduced, but it is not obvious why
that matters so much. Suppose, for example, that pre-Furman, there
were 1,000 death penalties, 100 of which "deserved" a life sentence
instead, and post-Furman there were 100 death sentences, 10 of
which deserved a life sentence instead. Shifting from pre- to postFurman does not change the proportion of arbitrary death sentences
to nonarbitrary ones, and results in 90 "correct" life sentences at
the expense of 810 "incorrect" life sentences. In a system in which
errors cannot be extirpated, distinguishing between these two scenarios is not simple, a task Justice Stevens did not even attempt.
Each of the opinions considered so far suffers from an analogous limitation. Each purports to treat a dynamic question-the nature of inference-with the standard deductive tools of appellate
decision making. I suggest this in large measure is what makes the
plurality's opinion appear so wooden and unpersuasive, and the dissenters' opinions so illogical. If the relevant universe cannot be

carved up usefully into discrete categories, deductive methodologies
are problematic.3 2 Had Justice Scalia attacked these opinions on
31 It is also possible that this is just an awkward summary of his point in Furman to the
effect that the limiting criteria distilled the remaining class. Since I do not know what he
meant beyond what he said, I will assume he meant what he said in both cases.
32 As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently commented, "Trying to
force a continuous world into two categories is .. .impossible." United States v.
Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990). Robin West recently attributed the analytical approach of the justices to their liberalism. West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 40, 85-93 (1990). My concern, by contrast, is not its cause but
its effect.

738

RONALDJ. ALLEN

[Vol. 81

this ground, the substance of his opinion might have added more to
the intellectual content of the judicial dialogue than his harsh rhetoric subtracted, but he took a different tack. Rather than being the
antidote for the intellectual errors of his colleagues, his opinion is
virtually the paradigm case of those errors.
Justice Scalia concurs in the result, 33 but announces that the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence is so screwy that he no longer
will be bound by selected parts of it, in particular the holdings of
Woodson v. North Carolinas4 and Lockett v. Ohio. 3 5 His opening assertion of the illogic of his colleagues not only sets the tone for the
remainder of his opinion but also demonstrates clearly the nature
and limits of his methodology: "The ultimate choice in capital sentencing... is a unitary one-the choice between death and imprisonment. One cannot have discretion whether to select the one yet
lack discretion to select the other."3 6 The obvious explanation of
this remarkable passage is that it rests upon the proposition that the
only manner in which an issue may be analyzed is syllogistically with
binary choices. A person is to live or die; a decision maker either
has or lacks discretion. Every decision making process, maybe every
process injustice Scalia's view, must be governed by a single principle entailing binary choices, no matter how complex or segmented
that process may be. In essence, Justice Scalia has conflated the
effect of a decision with the process leading to it.
Exposing the implicit justification ofJustice Scalia's view refutes
it. There is no logical or other authoritative principle forbidding
the use of differing intellectual tools depending upon the task. Indeed, Justice Scalia's apparent insistence to the contrary verges on
the incoherent. Suppose we decide that fact finders do not have discretion to reach a result, by which we mean they are obligated to
apply the decision rule of uncertainty that we supply them. If they
find X by a preponderance of the evidence, then Y is to be the verdict. Does this apparent denial of discretion in one context require
that they exercise no discretion in any context? Does it mean, for
example, that the fact finders do not have discretion to disregard
evidence because they believe it lacks probative value even though
admitted by the trial judge? To echo Justice Scalia, how can it be
that they have and do not have discretion? Take another example.
Does the denial of discretion in the decision rule mean that the fact
33 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3061 (Scalia,

J., concurring).
34 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
35 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
36 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3058-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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finders have no discretion to structure the deliberative process?
How can it be that they have and do not have discretion?
The real question is how could it be otherwise. Different parts
of a process can be, and in some instances must be, structured in
different ways. It is perfectly sensible to say that certain facts condition eligibility to some benefit or disability and that, after the minimum requirements are met, discretion is to be exercised, a point
instantiated constantly in everyday life. For example, to be admitted
to many colleges, an applicant's index comprising a mix of grade
point and test scores must reach a certain score, but a discretionary
judgment is made to admit particular applicants in the remaining
pool. Conditioning eligibility to a death sentence on specified criteria, and permitting the exercise of judgment-which is all "discretion" means in this context3 7-as to whether to impose the death
sentence are perfectly analogous. Only if the quite conventional
practice of decision making exemplified by college admissions is "illogical" would Justice Scalia be right, and he makes no argument
that that is so.
Justice Scalia's opinion as it stands contains either an egregious
error or an equally egregious omission, and I suggest one possible
explanation is that he is blinded by the seductive power of deduction. Several passages in his opinion confirm this hypothesis. He
says, for example, that "[t]his second doctrine [of mercy]counterdoctrine would be a better word-has completely exploded
whatever coherence the notion of 'guided discretion' once had."' 8
This overlooks that the two doctrines may be designed to do different things. He asserts as proof of the illogic of his colleagues that
"[o]ur cases proudly announce that the Constitution effectively prohibits the States from excluding from the sentencing decision any
aspect of a defendant's character or record, or any circumstance surrounding the crime: [for example] that the defendant had a poor
and deprived childhood, or that he had a rich and spoiled childhood," 39 his point being that these both cannot be mitigating. But
situated in real human beings, they could be, not in and of themselves, of course, but connected to other aspects of defendants'
lives. Only if categories have to be carved out in advance would
Justice Scalia be right, but he has not explained why that is required.
Consider two final assertions that bring Justice Scalia directly
37 See generally Symposium: Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1312 (1984).
38 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3061 (Scalia, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 3062 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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back to the errors of his colleagues, even though he attempts to enlighten us about rather than exemplify them:
The... requirement [of mitigation] destroys whatever rationality and
predictability the . .. requirement [of aggravation] was designed to

achieve.... The issue is whether, in the process of the individualized
sentencing determination, the society may specify which factors are
relevant, and which are not-whether it may insist upon a rational
scheme in which all sentencers making the individualized determinations apply the same standard.... It is impossible to understand why
[the Constitution demands categories for aggravation and none for
mitigation, and thus] it becomes impossible to claim that the Constitution requires consistency and rationality among sentencing determinations to be preserved by
strictly limiting the reasons for which each
40
sentencer can say 'yes.'
Justice Scalia's superficially appealing call for rationality and standards is a call for decision by rule. Fact X either is or is not mitigating, just like a decision maker must or must not have discretion.
There is, in Justice Scalia's cosmology, no judgment to exercise,
only facts to be found and rules to be applied.
Suppose, however, that mitigation is not designed to achieve
rationality and predictability; suppose instead it is designed to implement judgment. In that case, Justice Scalia's argument comes
tumbling down, and the Court's scheme may be rescued. Judgment
cannot be captured in rules; if it could be, judgment would not be
required. Thus, the real question that cases like Walton pose is
whether a justification other than one resting primarily on "predictability," "reliability," or "accuracy" can be constructed for the
Court's bifurcated approach to capital sentencing, and I think it can.
Doing so requires approaching the issue of capital sentencing free
from the assumption that all legal questions require decision making
by a priori rules, and examining instead the conditions under which a
priori rules further a desirable goal at an acceptable cost.
Rough judgments of the relative culpability of acts, by which I
mean to include the contemporaneous state of mind of the actor,
have long been integral to the criminal law. These judgments at
their roughest level separate misdemeanors from felonies, and at a
more refined level, various degrees of an offense. That these judgments reflect more widely held views in the society at large is confirmed by our intuitions (robbing a bank seems different from
stealing a package of gum; negligent acts resulting in harm or death
seem different from purposeful or knowledgeable acts with similar
outcomes); by the persistence of the categories over time in a demo40

Id. at 3063-64 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cratic society; and by their history, which demonstrates that a significant factor in separating crimes into degrees was nullifying juries
that refused to convict on facts within the existing prohibitions but
which morally called for different treatment.4 1 Justice Stevens' inverted pyramid metaphor may be amended somewhat to capture
this point. It is not the reduction in the absolute size of the death
eligible class that accomplishes the result he attributes to the reduction. Rather, it is that the method of selection takes proportionally
more cases out of the mix where death would be inappropriate. If it
is not illogical to use deliberation or premeditation to distinguish
first degree murder from second degree murder, and the fact that
most legislatures have done so indicates that the distinction captures a widespread intuition, why is it illogical to use "especially heinous or cruel" to distinguish capital murder from first degree
murder? Moreover, why would we not think that this distinction
most likely captures another intuition? The answer is obvious: it is
not illogical at all to make the distinction, and it probably does capture a widely held intuition.
This argument would not insulate any particular capital sentencing scheme from constitutional review; it merely specifies more
carefully the justification for aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances do not serve simply to reduce the size of the
death eligible class, as Justice Stevens suggests, nor do they serve
simply as an undifferentiated brake on discretion, as Justice Scalia
suggests. 42 Rather, they eliminate from the death eligible group the
cases for which death would be inappropriate. Or at least that is
what they should do. Thus, the proper vocabulary to criticize them
with is precisely the vocabulary of rationality. Do the aggravating
circumstances capture reasonably well understandable moral judgments? Are they so idiosyncratic as to cast doubt on whether they
reflect widely held moral intuitions? Are they seriously -overinclusive, so that the risk of an inappropriate death sentence is not reduced? Is the pyramid that Justice Stevens talks of properly or
misshapenly constructed? These are the questions to ask. But these
are standard, categorical questions that are well within the normal
competence of appellate courts. Thus, attention must turn to how
the mitigation function differs, for if it does not, Justice Scalia's
complaint of illogic is correct.
The difference emerges from the intersection of the perhaps
41 For a good discussion on this subject, see T. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE (1985).
42 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3063 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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counterintuitive recognition that the set of death eligible defendants
is relatively homogeneous and the common fact that differentiation
within a fairly homogeneous set requires the exercise of judgment.
If it is the case that the group of death eligible defendants deserve to
die in some constitutionally acceptable sense, then that set is fairly
homogeneous. That does not mean, however, that no distinctions
among its member may be made. It merely means that distinctions
cannot be made by categorical rule. If they could, the group would
not be homogeneous. But if distinctions can be made, but not by
rule, then they can only be made by judgment. They can only be
made, in other words, if the decision maker is free from rules and
allowed to consider whatever is advanced. The role of mitigation is
best understood as implementing just such a scheme. It is designed
to permit fine, not gross, distinctions among death eligible individuals to be made. The counterintuitive nature of this point stems, I
think, from the fact that the fine distinction yields a gross difference-literally the difference between life and death. But merely
because the consequences are great does not entail that the justifications for the distinction are obvious or rough. Refer again to the
example of college admissions. Many people are rejected who are
virtually indistinguishable in certain respects from those who are admitted. The process looks arbitrary if viewed from the perspective
of justifying the parameters of the two categories, but it looks considerably less so if viewed from the perspective of implementing
judgment.
This answers Justice Scalia's complaint. Mitigation is not
designed to implement reliability or predictability, and the defenders of mitigation should forgo that vocabulary. It is designed to permit judgment to be exercised. Judge or juror is to consider
whatever is advanced by the defendant to see if in the context of the
defendant's life story, as seen through the lens of the decision
maker's life story, there is an understandable and suitably powerful,
even though subtle, reason to extend mercy. Neither the defendant's life story nor the intellectual resources brought to its evaluation by the decision maker will be capable of capture in rules,
however. That is not the nature of this task.
Clarifying the nature of mitigation has a number of subsidiary
benefits. It demonstrates further why Justice Scalia's ridiculing of
the apparently inconsistent mitigating factors is at best beside the
point. Any particular fact is of very little consequence standing
alone. The web of facts is what matters. A person from a poor and
educationally deprived background who has transcended it and begun to make a success of life, but who kills to advance economic
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opportunities, may have no claim on our sympathies. A person
from a rich and spoiled background may also be from one of little
parental involvement in rearing, and may suffer from recurring
bouts of depression and drug use, and thus his acts may be thought
less responsible than that of our upwardly mobile, albeit deprived,
killer.
Clarifying the nature of mitigation also clarifies the structure of
mitigation, which in turn is a needed corrective for one of the
wooden aspects of the debate occurring in the Court. That debate
proceeds as though the relevant "facts" were just whatJustice Scalia
ridicules-such matters as a deprived or spoiled background-but
this misses a crucial point. Those are not themselves "facts" in the
sense of legally significant conclusions; rather, those "facts" are evidence of the legally significant conclusion, which is whether to grant
mercy or not. If they were the legally operative "facts," Justice
Scalia's scathing attack on his colleagues would have some merit.
For then these "facts" would begin to look very much like other
operative legal facts, such as intent in the definition of homicide.
Here Justice Scalia would be right if he said "intent either is or is
not an element of homicide." But he would be wrong, or at least
seriously misleading, if he said, "X's testimony about Y's behavior
either does or does not establish intent." X's testimony must be
analyzed or, in the Court's terminology, processed. However, it
makes no sense to say that, because the conclusion that rests on X's
testimony must be established beyond reasonable doubt, one must
believe X beyond a reasonable doubt or disregard the evidence, for
intent can be established in lots of ways involving an infinite variety
of combinations and permutations of evidence. 43 To so require
would seem odd because it confuses the admission of evidence,
44
which is tested by a simple standard of tolerant reasonableness,
with the inference to be drawn from that evidence, which is some
legally operative fact and to which a definite decision rule, such as
preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt, is applied.45 The legally operative fact in death hearings is whether to
mitigate-whether the defendant's life story provides an adequate
excuse to escape execution. Such a matter as the deprived nature of
the defendant's background is evidence from which that conclusion
43 For an argument to the contrary, see Lewis, Proof and Preudice: A Constitutional
Challenge to the Treatment of PrdudicialEvidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REv.
289 (1989).
44
R. ALEN & R. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 101-06 (1989).
45 A similar point, but put to a quite different purpose, is made by Justice Blackmun
in his concurrence in McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1990).
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may be inferred, but it will be inferred in light of all the evidence
46
presented on the issue.
If evidence of intent is analogous to evidence that mercy is in
order, and an inference of intent is analogous to a conclusion that
mercy should be extended, then it makes little sense to talk of burdens of proof with respect to the evidence of mitigation. This again
is an analytical error of all the participants to this debate on the
Court. By contrast, it makes perfect sense to ask whether the sentencer has been convinced of the justification for mercy by some
standard of proof, and precisely that amount of "consistency" can
be imported into the process. The justification for mercy, though,
will emerge from all the evidence adduced and will not be a function
of any discrete "fact" like a deprived or spoiled background.
Of course, different sentencers will see the issue in different
ways, which I suspect is the lurking unspoken problem. The evidence presented at a sentencing hearing will not bear its implica47
tions on its face; it will have to be interpreted by the sentencer.
Because of differing life experiences, one juror may find a defendant's background mitigating whereas another may find it aggravating. This is not proof of "randomness" in decision making, as
Justice Scalia would have it.48 Again, it is simply the consequence of
judgment, of human decision making encompassing too many variables to be reduced to rules.
Whether to incorporate judgment into capital sentencing may
be controversial, but I hope that I have shown that it is not controversial for the reasons advanced in the debate on the Court. If it is
controversial, it is for other reasons integral to the comparison of a
rules approach to one entailingjudgment. Rules convey the appearance of certitude, that very appearance that has seduced Justice
Scalia. 49 Judgment entails forgoing certitude and placing faith in a
46 Perhaps this is whatJustice Blackmun was getting at when he said: "Application of
the preponderance standard in this context is especially problematic in light of the fact
that the 'existence' of a mitigating factor frequently is not a factual issue to which a 'yes'
or 'no' answer can be given." Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47 See Allen, On the Significance of BattingAverages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarificationof the
"Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof
Beyond Reasonable Dofzbt, 65 TUL. L. REV. (1991) (forthcoming).
48 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
49 Interestingly, it has not seduced him entirely. In Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092
(1990), the primary issue was whether Arizona had properly narrowed the "heinousness" aggravating circumstance, arid, relying on Walton, the Court held that it had. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3100-01. The interesting part of the opinion is the standard of review
of the application of the aggravating circumstances requirement. The Court concluded
that Jackson v. Virginia's "anyrational fact finder" standard is the proper one. Id. at
3102 (quotingJackson, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). If any rational fact finder could infer
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particular decision maker. For political or social reasons, the appearance even without the reality of certitude may be preferable to a
virtually unconstrained process of judgment. The appearance of
certitude may belie the reality, 50 however, which becomes an argument for judgment if the appearance of unconstrained decision
making can be tolerated.
There is a deeper question here, which is when can or should
the appearance of unconstrained decision making be tolerated? 5 '
There is no simple answer to this question. Certain conditions can
be specified, however. When the primary concern is to impose order on chaos, rules are in order. Perhaps the present state of international law is a good example, where the primary concern is with
the construction of a stable order that conveys in a general sense
rights and obligations. Where forgoing rules will not likely lead to
regrettable chaos, judgment may be preferable for its individuating
consequences. Permitting individuated decisions on mitigation is a
good example. Suchjudgments will not undermine the criminaljustice process, since the only thing being decided is whether to sentence someone to jail instead of death. Moreover, there seems to be
a consensus on the intuition that moral judgments must be made
because of the enormous consequences to the defendant, and they
can only be made free from the constraints of rules. There is thus
from the evidence produced at trial the presence of a legitimate version of the "especially cruel or heinous" aggravating circumstance, the defendant's rights are not violated. The effect is essentially to curtail federal review, and to reduce considerably the
probability of uniform national treatment. Curiously, Justice Scalia does not dissent on
this. Perhaps it is just an example of his opinion in Walton, but then he should not have
joined the opinion. This will lead to increased unpredictability in results, which supposedly was the cause of his fulminations in Walton. From my perspective, this is an example of the Court deferring to the reasoning process of someone else-in this case the.
state courts-and it is an example of the solution that should be applied to mitigating
circumstances.
Lewis suggests another possible explanation of the death cases. A certain wing of
the Court wishes to get out of the death business entirely by leaving most decisions to
the states, and another wing wants to restrict the scope of the death penalty as much as
they can. I note but do not discuss further this possibility. There is no way to know if
thejustices are playing rhetorical games, and holding them to task for the implications
of what they actually say may create disincentives for such behavior, if it is occurring,
and useful for other reasons if it is not.
50 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1981) ("The rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency.").
51 More precisely, when should it be encouraged? This is more precise because all
human decision making involves judgment of one sort or another. Even in a decision
making context bound by rules, judgment will be exercised as to whether the conditions
of the rule have been met. The crucial distinction for my purposes is between discretion
in finding particular facts, and discretion in determining the implications of whatever
facts are found.
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little to be lost and something to be gained from forgoing rules
52
here.
There is another difference between rules and judgment, one
that I suspect plays a regrettably powerful role in this area: the application of rules can be reviewed on appeal, whereas exercise of
judgment cannot. One would thus predict an overreliance on rules
by appellate courts in an attempt to maintain their authority on appeal. In the death penalty context, this is one possible explanation
for all the "rules" talk about reliability, even by those who logically
should be talking in a completely different vocabulary. Rules are
crucial to maintaining appellate authority, and not surprisingly appellate courts become habituated to rules talk. The Supreme Court
may be particularly strongly addicted to it because its peculiar role
primarily involves providing rules of national significance, a role
that has little room for individuated justice. This more general thesis is borne out by a number of other lines of decision in the
Supreme Court, which like the death penalty cases, also involve the
conflict between rules and judgment. Consider the following three
examples:
A.

THE "MERE SYMPATHY" INSTRUCTION

In California v. Brown, 53 the Court reviewed a jury instruction
which said that the jury "must not be swayed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public
feeling" during the penalty phase of a capital case. 54 The Court's
analysis of the instruction typifies its awkward treatment in cases involving some other decision maker's inferential process. The Court
approved this instruction because it concluded that a juror would
interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses
that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase.... [A] reasonable juror would ...

understand the instruction ... as a directive to ignore only the sort of
sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced
during the penalty phase. 5 5

The Court's argument is persuasive with respect to certain aspects of the instruction. Some of its forbidden categories are morally objectionable or otherwise inappropriate. The admonition to
avoid conjecture and not be swayed by public feeling and opinion
52 This is not to say that rules could not be imposed. It is only to explain what I
observe.
53 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
54 Id. at 539.
55 Id. at 542.
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can be understood as directing the jury's attention to the facts at
hand. I doubt it to be controversial that the jury should not decide
on the assumption that the defendant had a poor and deprived background if the evidence shows a rich and spoiled one instead, and the
jury knows better than the unattending public what the facts are.
The elimination of prejudice is another comprehensible component
of this instruction that merely reminds the jury of the national commitment not to judge individuals on immutable characteristics. But
what could it possibly mean to avoid "sentiment" or "sympathy"
that is not rooted in the record? Putting aside the Witherspoon 5 6 issue, in what else could such responses be rooted? The reason that a
juror would feel "sentiment" or "sympathy" for a defendant is only
because of a defendant. 5 7 Apart from a general antipathy to the
death penalty, which is the Witherspoon problem, there is no other
source for such feelings. The rule that the Court adopts, approving
jury instructions limiting sentimental and sympathetic responses to
those generated by the evidence in the record, creates a false dichotomy, in which lies the peculiar awkwardness of this opinion.
In a partial confirmation of my thesis, the Court proceeds to
argue that "by limiting the jury's sentencing considerations to record evidence, the State also ensures the availability of meaningful
judicial review, another safeguard that improves the reliability of the
sentencing process." 5 8 This is false, although revealing. The
sources of sentiment or sympathy will be the interaction of the
unique background and experience of the decision maker and
whatever happens at trial. To be sure, a reviewing court can appraise for itself what the record contains, but doing so will not increase reliability in the sense of increasing confidence that death is
more consistent with public mores. Doing so merely transfers
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
I put aside the inverse case of sympathy adverse to the defendant, from feelings
for the victim's family, for instance. I would, however, make an analogous argument
here. With one caveat, the prosecution should be, and typically is, allowed to respond
with evidence inconsistent with the defendant's proffers of mitigating factors. Indeed, I
56

57

would go further and allow the prosecution to situate the victim, even if the defendant
had not been shown to be aware of the victim's family or profession or whatever. The
social harm from murderous acts is a relevant factor in making the kinds of moral judgments jurors are called upon to make, and criminal defendants typically face strict liability aspects of elements, even if they are not explicitly denominated as such. The caveat
is that the state should be constrained in presenting evidence that effectively cannot be
rebutted even if false. For example, suppose the state produced evidence that the victim
had a wonderful marriage, and suppose further that nothing could be further from the
truth. The defendant could hardly be expected to rebut the inference with evidence,
say, that the victim was a cruel and unattentive husband. This is the best explanation for
the otherwise curious case of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
58

Brown, 479 U.S. at 543.
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power from one locus to another, from lay decision makers to
judges or from trial judges to appellate judges. This may increase
predictability in a different sense, however. In fact, if appellate
judges rather than juries decide when death should be imposed
based on a cold record, increased predictability should result for
two reasons. With fewer people involved in the process, fewer
unique people will be involved, thus increasing predictability. In
addition, the "record" is never a full story of what actually happened at trial, and thus the appellate judges will be deciding on a
relatively impoverished evidentiary base. As the complexity of the
evidentiary base diminishes, predictability should increase. But that
merely reiterates the central question of the nature of capital sentencing. The increase in predictability is regrettable just to the extent one wishes to invoke conventional reasoning to examine the life
experiences of the defendant. If, by contrast, the point is to reduce
the input of conventional reasoners or to maintain appellate authority, and the Court's explicit recognition of this latter point is the
revealing aspect of the opinion, enhancing the role of appellate
judges is justifiable.
Brown confirms my general thesis in another way. The other
opinions of the Court are as unpersuasive as the majority's, indicating the difficulty these cases pose for the justices. Justice O'Connor
sees the issue to be "whether an instruction designed to satisfy the
principle that capital sentencing decisions must not be made on
mere whim, but instead on clear and objective standards, violates
the principle that the sentencing body is to consider any relevant
mitigating evidence." 5 9 She concludes that it does not:
In my view, evidence about the defendant's background and character
is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.... Thus, the sentence

imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response
to the defendant's background,
character, and crime rather than mere
60
sympathy or emotion.
The belief to which Justice O'Connor refers explains why evidence
is relevant, but the question is what is sufficient. To say that the
sentence "should reflect a reasoned moral response" begs the question even as it emphasizes "moral." Virtually any "mere sympathy"
that is not irrational relates to a moral ground. The mere fact of the
horrible plight of a defendant facing a possible death sentence gen59
60

Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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erates a sense of sympathy, which at a minimum facilitates the construction of a moral argument in favor of leniency. Indeed, one
would wonder about the humanity of a sentencer who felt to the
contrary. To be sure, a juror could be required to determine
whether some category, a deprived background for instance, is present, and thus implement Justice O'Connor's sense of morality, but
to implement his or her own sense of morality requires being free
from the syllogistic approachJustice O'Connor is here promoting. 6 1
The question begging continues injustice O'Connor's opinion:
Because the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the
death penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant,
and not an emotional response to the mitigating evidence, I agree with
the Court that an instruction informing the jury that they 'must not be
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
public opinion
or public feeling' does not by itself violate [the
62
Constitution].
What distinguishes an "emotional response to the mitigating evidence" from a "reasoned" one is not articulated, and not surprisingly for it could not be satisfactorily articulated. One example will
suffice: compassion is an emotion but inseparable from morality.
Perhaps "emotion" can be kept out of certain kinds of decision making, but it is integral to, if not quite at the heart of, the decision to
grant mercy. The essence of that question is precisely whether
something in the defendant's background triggers a sympathetic response in the sentencer.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, comes close to getting it right:
"In forbidding the sentencer to take sympathy into account, this language on its face precludes precisely the response that a defendant's
evidence of character and background is designed to elicit ....,63
But, he makes two errors. He accepts the Court's erroneous argument that there is such a thing as "mere sympathy" that may be
extirpated from capital sentencing hearings,64 and he reiterates the
common but regrettable theme that there is a relationship between
65
reliability and individualized sentencing.
61

For an extended discussion, see A. JONSEN & S.

TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASU-

isTRY: A HisToRY OF MORAL REASONING (1988). Even if emotions could be separated

from "a reasoned moral response," because moral reasoning is situated not abstract,
there is no reason to think that appellatejudges are more adroit in this form of reasoning than lay individuals, and the judges are certainly less representative of the community at large.
62 Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 Justice (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 548-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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OnlyJustice Blackmun gets it right, and his opinion is deserving
of quotation:
While the sentencer's decision to accord life to a defendant at times
might be a rational or moral one, it also may arise from the defendant's appeal to the sentencer's sympathy or mercy, human qualities
that are undeniably emotional in nature ....
... The sentencer's ability to respond with mercy towards a defendant
has always struck me as a particularly valuable aspect of the capital
sentencing procedure... In my view, we adhere so strongly to our
belief that sentencers should have the opportunity to spare a capital
defendant's life on account of compassion for the individual because,
recognizing that the capital sentencing decision must be made in the
context of "contemporary values," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ.), we see in the sentencer's
expression
of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply
66
value.
Exactly so.
Justice Blackmun's willingness to defer to the natural reasoning
power of lay jurors has not carried the day, however. In Saffle v.
Parks,67 the Court extended Brown in deciding whether an instruction telling the jury "to avoid any influence of sympathy" violates
the eighth amendment. 68 According to the Court, in now familiar
language: "There is a simple and logical difference between rules
that govern what factors the jury must be permitted to consider in
making its sentencing decision, and rules that govern how the State
may guide the jury in considering and weighing those factors in
reaching a decision." 6 9 The crucial extension quickly comes:
"[W]hether a juror feels sympathy for a capital defendant is more
likely to depend on that juror's own emotions than on the actual
evidence regarding the crime and the defendant." 70 Brown, however, does not require that a juror be allowed to give sway to his or
her sentiments; rather, Brown stands for the proposition that a jury
may be admonished to "ignore emotional responses that are not
rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence," 7 1 and that a
state may "prohibi[t] juries from basing their sentencing decisions
on factors not presented at trial."' 72 Here, the defendant is relying
on

Id. at 561-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
And if so, whether it is a "new rule" for purposes of habeas corpus. This is an
aspect of the opinion I address, but only in passing.
69 Safle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261.
70 Id. at 1262.
71 Id. at 1263.
72 Id.
66
67
68
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a negative inference: because we concluded in Brown that it was permissible under the Constitution to prevent the jury from considering
emotions not based upon the evidence, it follows that the Constitution
requires that the jury be allowed to consider and
give effect to emo73
tions that are based upon mitigating evidence.
The Court doubts this, but then says that it would have been a new
rule anyway, thus habeas corpus is not available.
There are two issues here: the first is whether there is a distinction between a "reasoned moral response" and an "emotional one;"
the second is whether the response of whatever sort must be rooted
in the evidence. Brown is being read as simply approving an instruction requiring an emotional response to be rooted in the evidence.
Neither distinction can be made. Emotions and "reasoned moral
responses" are inseparable, and what is "in the record" is a function
of how the jury analyzes the problem. This is another example of
the mistake of thinking that evidence comes stamped with its implications and may be analyzed deductively. 74 As Justice Brennan in
dissent accurately points out,
the majority's language is strangely reminiscent of the argument
trumpeted by the dissent in Penry v. Lynaugh where Justice Scalia, writing for four Members of the Court, argued that 'the instructions had to
render all mitigating circumstances relevant to the jury's verdict, but
the precise manner of their relevance-the
precise effect of their con75
sideration-could be channeled by law.'
I will not reiterate my complaints about this form of reasoning. One
does wonder, though, why jurors are necessary or useful if evidence
does indeed come stamped with its implications in the way Justice
Scalia believes.
B.

THE OBSCENrrY CASES

Another example of the Supreme Court responding with rules
where deference is in order is its treatment of jury instructions in
obscenity cases such as Pope v. Illinois.76 The question in Pope was
whether the jury should be instructed to employ community standards in deciding the third prong of the Miller v. California77 test of
obscenity, which requires the trier of fact to determine whether the
litigated work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Court announced that "[t]he proper
73 Id.
74 See Allen,
75

supra note 47.
Salffe, 110 S.Ct. at 1269 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2966 (1989)

(Scalia, J., dissenting in part)).
76 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
77

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community
would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in
allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would
78
find such value in the material, taken as a whole."
If the central idea here is to obtain community judgment, the
Court's test is quite remarkable. As the dissent accurately points
out, the Court seems to be asking a juror to find that "ordinary"
members of the community are not "reasonable," 79 for otherwise
this holding makes no sense at all. But what would it mean for the
ordinary member of some community not to be reasonable, and
even if that were a coherent question, how could some other indistinguishable member of the community make such a judgment?
80
The obscenity cases are highly similar to the death penalty cases.
In both, there are forces pulling in opposite directions. On the one
hand lies the apparent necessity of deferring to some external (to
the formal legal system) reasoner and on the other a seeming inability or reluctance to do so. If the explanation is inability, it stems
from a conceptual failure; if it is reluctance, it is a matter of protecting judicial authority from lay encroachment. In either case, the solution would be the same. If "obscenity" is a fact with a concrete
reality existing apart from community consensus, then its attributes
need to be defined for and provided to the "fact finder," whomever
that turns out to be. If "obscenity" is a value of a community, then
the only question is what is the relevant community, and once defined its members must be permitted to reason conventionally about
8
the subject. '
78 Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01.

79 Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 See also, Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity
Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J. 617 (1989).
81 On occasion the Court indicates an awareness of the basic thesis of this article.
One example is its recent revolt against the multitudinous articulations of the proper
standard by which to judge ambiguous jury verdicts, the existence of which, by the way,
is evidence for my thesis. In Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990), the jury was
given 11 factors "to take into account and be guided by," and then told to sentence to
death if aggravating factors outweighed mitigating ones, and life if the contrary. One of
the issues was whether the instruction would be construed as limiting the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence. After reviewing the many different standards for testing
jury instructions (e.g., "would have," "could have" or is there a "reasonable possibility"
or "substantial possibility" that a juror misunderstood the instruction or misapplied it),
the Court concluded that it could not distinguish the various meanings supposedly contained within the various articulations. The Court was understandably puzzled, for example, how ajuror "could have" but "would not have" misunderstood an instruction. It
seems as though if the juror could have, he or she would have. If thejuror could have,
but did not, he or she must have acted for a reason which, had it been ignored, would
have made the behavior unreasonable. The Court replaced the various articulations
with a test focusing on "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has ap-
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THE RELIABILITY OF OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS

For my last example, I wish to compare briefly two cases from
last term, Idaho v. Wright 8 2 and Alabama v. White.8 3 As previously
mentioned, part of the difficulty with a syllogistic approach to matters requiring inference or judgment is the tendency to behave as
though evidence comes stamped with its implications upon it, somewhat like the USDA stamps that indicate the quality of beef. This
tendency is perfectly understandable. If evidence cannot be objectively evaluated, if it does not come with its implications evident on
the surface, then the primary choice that a reviewing court has is to
defer or not to defer. Analysis of the sort normally involved in appellate decision making will be of no avail. These two cases, both
singly but particularly counterposed, make this point well.
Wright was a case of alleged child abuse. The mother of two
daughters was accused of having molested them. The children were
5 1/2 and 2 1/2 years old at the time of the alleged abuse, and 6 and 3
years old at the time of trial. The older daughter was able to testify
to the events, but the younger daughter was not. There was confirming physical evidence. Shortly after the allegations surfaced, the
younger daughter was examined by a "pediatrician with extensive
experience in child abuse cases." ' 4 During the examination, the
daughter made statements that inculpated her mother. Those statements were admitted at trial pursuant to Idaho's residual exception
to the hearsay rule, and the question was whether admission violated the confrontation clause. The Court held that it did.
The Court's opinion is curious for a number of reasons centering on confrontation clause jurisprudence, for example its resurrection of Ohio v. Roberts8 5 as the paradigm for analysis of the
relationship between hearsay and the confrontation clause, but it is
curious for another reason as well. The Court held that hearsay
statements that are not within well rooted exceptions to the hearsay
rule must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to be
admitted without violating the confrontation clause. The State did
not dispute this general proposition; rather, it argued that the
proper test of reliability is the totality of the circumstances. The
Court agreed, sort of: "We agree that 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the circumplied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 1198.
82 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
83 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
84 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3143.
85 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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stances, but we think the relevant circumstances include only those
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief."8 6 Because the concern is
"whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the
truth when the statement was made, ... hearsay evidence used to
convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its
inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at
trial." 8 7
The Court's approach would be fine if evidence came labeled
with its inferential implications, but it does not. No statement at
trial is, or is not, "inherently trustworthy." Trustworthiness is a
function of the relationship between any proposition advanced at
trial, all the other propositions advanced, and the appraisal of that
interrelated set by the decision maker. In making a determination
of trustworthiness, the decision maker certainly will attend to its assessment of the internal coherence of testimony and the apparent
credibility of the source, and perhaps this is what the Court means
by "inherently trustworthy." Nonetheless, the determination of
trustworthiness will not be limited to the internal coherence of the
statement, and the credibility of the source will not be determined
simply as a function of immediately appraising the witness. One important determinant of reliability is the manner in which any particular testimony meshes with other testimony, as well as with what the
decision maker believes to be reasonable. These are not matters
that can be limited to the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement.
The weakness of the Court's analysis is evident in the fact that
of the four examples given of "factors that we think properly relate
to whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are reliable,"8 8 two of them cannot be reconciled
with the test the Court articulates. Lack of motive and the "use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age" 89 have no evidentiary implications without extending consideration beyond the circumstances surrounding the statement itself. A person's motives
are obviously a function of a complex background, and whether a
child employs too complex diction is a function of the child's development. To be sure, these are factors that will be operating at the
time the statement is given, but this simply reiterates that the question is the reliability of the statement. It disconfirms that the relia86
87

Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3148.
Id. at 3150.

88 Id.
89

Id.
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bility analysis can be artificially limited to the "inherent"
characteristics of a statement itself.
Examine the question from the flip side of the coin. Suppose a
child witness who appears to remember the relevant events and employs proper syntax and diction, who constantly repeats her accusations and who appears calm at the time of testimony (to pick up the
other two categories to which the Court refers). But suppose further that subsequent evidence shows the child to be an inveterate
liar with a long line of incidents at school where it has been conclusively established that she lied. Or, assume that other evidence establishes a consistent tendency to fantasize in a direction quite
consistent with the child's testimony. Such matters clearly are relevant to determining the reliability of the testimony, and just as
clearly are not "inherent" in the testimony. The point, of course, is
that if extraneous matters are relevant to show the lack of trustworthiness of the source, they are relevant to show trustworthiness as
well.
Perhaps the point that the Court was trying to make is that the
inquiry should be whether the witness is a truth teller rather than
whether the witness is telling the truth. In other words, perhaps the
Court was attempting to restrict the tendency to collapse this case
into a harmless error rule in order to avoid the bootstrapping effect:
if other evidence sufficiently establishes guilt, then this testimony is
corroborated, and thus its admission is at worst harmless and at best
justified. The problem is that corroboration does not just bootstrap; it confirms. One gains greater trust in any particular source
as its propositions become more coherent with the propositions
from other sources. Remarkably, the Court recognized this in the
second case I wish to consider, Alabama v. White. 90
In White, the issue was the propriety of a Terry stop. The police
received an anonymous tip that White would be carrying cocaine.
The police corroborated certain aspects of the tip, stopped her car,
searched the car with her consent, found marijuana and arrested
her. At the station house, cocaine was found in her possession. The
only question before the Court was whether the police had sufficient
grounds to suspect criminality was afoot so that a Terry stop was permissible. The Court concluded that they did, reversing the lower
court's conclusion to the contrary. My primary interest in the case is
in just two sentences. The majority recognized that
The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is prob90 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
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ably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim
that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity. Thus, it is not
unreasonable to conclude in this case that the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer's predictions
imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by
the caller. 9 1
The point, I take it, is obvious. If "independent corroboration imparts some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the
caller" in White, it is hard, indeed impossible, to see why independent corroboration does not impart some degree of reliability to the
child witness in Wright.9 2 This again supports my primary thesis that
the cases that involve the inferential process of some other decision
maker are peculiarly troublesome for the Court, 93 and they virtually
always are awkward and unstable. 94
III.

In the canto from which the epigraph of this article is taken,
Dante continues:
Take what I said before with this distinction,
And in that fashion it can stand with what you
Believe of the first father and our Delight.
Id. at 2417 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983)).
Just how much corroboration is imparted is a different matter, and it is another
matter that cannot be reduced to rules. Consider the famous (to collegiate math students, at any rate) question: If a coin is flipped 10 times, and each time turns up heads,
what is the probability of a head on the eleventh flip? The answer is supposed to be
"0.5," and the question is supposed to instruct on independent conditions. The answer
is clearly not 0.5, because, were this done in the real world, one would begin to believe
the coin to be weighted (after all, the chances of getting ten straight heads is less than
one in a thousand with a fair coin; I think the chances of a weighted coin are greater than
that). Just how much one would, or more precisely "should," begin to believe that is
impossible to say.
93 Professor LaFave has promoted the view that fourth amendment law should tend
to generate standardized procedures applicable across a wide range of conduct and to
avoid rules that require the police to make individuated decisions of the propriety of a
search on a case by case basis. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127. Although there are some
similarities between our arguments, they are fundamentally different. His concern is
with the ability of the police to understand and apply complex rules provided by the
courts. My point is that in certain instances the rules provided by the courts do not
adequately capture the reality to which they are directed.
94 The Walton issue and the three examples that I have briefly discussed do not comprise the range of my point. The regulation of the inferential process of some other
decision maker than the Court extends over a wide area. Other examples are the In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), problems (for example, in Carella v. California, 491 U.S.
263 (1989), the Court struck down a presumption of intent to steal based on failure to
return car within 20 days; see also Michael H. V. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), upholding California's irrebutible presumption of paternity), the victim impact statements involved in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968) questions, among others.
91
92
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And may this always be lead to your feet,
To make you move slowly, like a tired man,
To the Yes and No which you cannot see.
For he is among the lowest fools
Who affirms or denies without distinction,
Doing one or the other in all cases.
Thus it happens that hasty judgments
In many instances incline to falseness,
And then one's fondness for them binds the mind.9 5
Some tasks are amenable to deductive methodologies, and
some are not. When a deductive approach is applied to a problem
that resists that methodology, the result is often affirmation or
denial without distinction leading to hasty judgments that incline to
falseness. But a problem immediately arises. What is a court faced
with problems such as those discussed in this article supposed to do
when its primary decision tools do not work? The answer is to use
different techniques, in particular deference, analogy, and decision
96
by reference to reliability rather than accuracy.
It may be the case that the most appropriate legal rule for some
particular setting involves deference to some other decision maker
than the highest court in a hierarchical legal system. If community
judgment is at the core of obscenity law, then conventional
reasoners from the community should make that judgment.
Reviewing their judgment on appeal cannot further the postulated
value. If probable cause determinations are best made in an ad hoc
manner by someone on or close to the scene, again appellate review
cannot easily improve on such a judgment. 9 7 Similarly, some
questions involve matters so complex that no coherent strategy
other than deference can work. The best example here is the nature
95 DANTE, THE DMNE COMEDY 368 (Pocket Books ed., L. Biancolli trans. 1968).

96 Note that "balancing" is not in the list. The Court's balancing jurisprudence
comprises a description of its own reasoning process, not someone else's. Thus, the
coherence and efficacy of balancing jurisprudence are tangential to my concerns. If the
Court does find it so hard to encapsulate its own reasoning within syllogistic
approaches, as the recurrence to balancing techniques suggests, it should come as no
surprise that its efforts to encapsulate the reasoning process of other individuals in an
analogous fashion is typically a failure.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Malin, 908 F.2d 163, 169 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,J.,

concurring), where Judge Easterbrook describes the Supreme Court's treatment of
"probable cause as a fact-bound judgment call .
He continues:
Multifactor tests do no comprise separable 'questions of law.' Rules of law
influence the application of the factors, and appellate courts may ensure that district
judges understand and apply these rules. But whenever the court must determine
'reasonableness' or climb the tiers of a multifactor approach, the result is a gestalt,
not a legal conclusion. Little is gained, and much can be lost, by having three
judges redo the work of one.
Id. at 169-70.
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of the inference of reliability central to Wright and White or the
judgment that mitigation is in order in Walton. The inference of
reliability and the determination of the appropriateness or morality
of a death sentence involve a natural reasoning process. Any effort
to cabin such a process by rules will likely lead to unnecessary and
counterproductive artificiality.
If an appellate court simply cannot keep its metaphorical hands
off a problem of judgment or inference, its next best option is to
encourage decision by analogy. Many problems that defy being
cabined by rules may be cabined somewhat by explicitly
approaching a decision analogically. No rules governing the
decision to mitigate can usefully be given, but paradigm examples of
cases of mitigation and no mitigation could be provided as guides
for decision. An analogous procedure is presently followed in many
obscenity trials, which often have a comparative element in them.
So proceeding is not costless, however, the primary cost being the
risk of the example becoming the rule.
Last, the courts can give up reliance on the notion of accuracy
and focus instead on reliability. For the reasons previously
discussed, appellate decision making is likely to be more reliable in
the sense that it is more predictable than jury or trial judge decision
making. But, "reliability" does not mean "accuracy," nor does it
mean "more likely to capture community mores." It just means
consistency. Consistency may be an important value. Any
particular jury, or trial judge, may get some decision "right," but
nonetheless that decision might look quite wrong to an outside
observer. One role of appellate judges is to rub off the rough edges
of individualized decision making by jurors and trial judges to
maintain the appearance of just decision making. 98 Here, though,
appearance is in explicit conflict with reality. There is no reason to
believe that the appellate judges reason better about many of the
issues of the type discussed in this article than do trial judges or
98 Recently, for reasons analogous to those that I have advanced, Judge Posner
expressed disquietude over the rigid set of rules purportedly applicable to judge

probable cause determinations. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir.
1990):
What is needed at this juncture in the evolving law of appellate review is not a
multiplicity of rigid rules stated in empty jargon, or even three rigid rules that hack

crudely at a complex reality, but the sensitive application of the clear-error
standard, understood as such, across the board. This is a cleaner as well as a more
honest approach than attempting the legerdemain of deriving from the words 'great
deference' a warrant for a nondeferential rule of appellate review to be squeezed
between de novo review and clear-error review.
I mention this here rather than in my discussion of deference because the point of a
clear error rule would be to advance reliability in the sense that I have articulated it in
the text.
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jurors. Thus, the justification cannot be to improve the quality of
decision making; it can only be to improve its appearance. Perhaps
that is a good enough reason to proceed; perhaps it is not. That,
though, is the real question.

